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THE INTELLIGENCE W PUTTING MUSC IN THE CIA

By ROBERT MOSS

COMPARISONS are already being drawn in Washington between the appointment of Mr William J. Casey as CIA director under the Reagan Administration and the choice of Mr John McCone for the same role under the Kennedy Administration.

Both men are shrewd non-professionals (although Mr Casey served with distinction in the Office of Strategic Services and is remembered with affection by many wartime colleagues in London) whose instinct may prove a surer guide to policy than the conventional wisdoms of the established bureaucracy. Mr McCone's instinct told him that Khrushchev had secreted missiles in Cuba when CIA analysts were still unconvinced. Similarly, Mr Casey is unlikely to pay overmuch respect to estimates from the analytical side of the CIA — the National Foreign Assessments Centre (NFAC) — suggesting that the motivation for the Soviet military build-up is essentially defensive; his instinct tells him otherwise.

According to sources inside Mr Reagan's CIA transition team, a major overhaul of NFAC is expected to be one of the first consequences of Mr Casey's appointment. The present head of NFAC, Mr Bruce Clark, is expected to be replaced.

One leading contender to take his place is Mr George Carver, a former CIA station chief in Bonn, now based at the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, who serves on Mr Reagan's transition team and has made himself a subtle and engaging commentator on intelligence matters.

In a parallel development, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the other components of Pentagon Intelligence are likely to be given a larger role in the shaping of national estimates; their predictive record is generally recognised to have been much better than that of NFAC.

Mr Casey and his team are likely to move slowly, avoiding radical staffing changes at Langley; the view in the Reagan camp is that the CIA has already been dangerously demoralised through purges of veteran officers.

However, the new CIA director is likely to want to re-engage the services of some of the senior people who were fired, or pressured into premature retirement under Admiral Stansfield Turner or his no-less controversial predecessor, Mr William Colby. In addition to analysis, the other component of CIA activities that is likely to be subjected to most rigorous scrutiny is counter-intelligence.

There is widespread concern that the counter-intelligence (CI) staff was fatally weakened in 1974, when Mr Colby managed to engineer the ouster of Mr James Jesus Angleton, for two decades the agency's CI chief.

The nominal cause of Mr Angleton's removal was the Press leak of his involvement in a programme of domestic mail intercepts. It was not made clear at the time that this programme had been initiated as early as 1953 with full presidential authority, and that it has resulted in the discovery of an important East German "illegal" as well as of contacts between prominent Congressional figures and the Soviet KGB.

Staff cuts

With Mr Angleton's fall, the powers of the centralised CIA staff were radically reduced, and the security of the department's own files — including sensitive studies of allied secret services — was lessened, giving rise to concern that CIA operations, and allied secrets, had become more vulnerable to Soviet detection and penetration.

Counter-intelligence is rarely popular within a secret service, since the CIA role is to play the institutional devil's advocate, questioning, for example, whether a defector or a double agent (whose case-handlers may be intensely proud of their catch) is genuine, or a KGB-controlled plant.

The breakdown of trust, however, entire intelligence penetration and by its antagonists, Mr Angleton and others who have been on the Reagan team on the next administration, his advice is weighed very seriously, not least because of the close relationship of trust that Mr Angleton established in the past with many friendly secret services, including the Israelis.

The whole question of CI organisation is taken up in a valuable collection of papers, edited by Dr Roy Godson, that will be published early next year by the Washington-based Consortium for the Study of Intelligence as part of a series entitled "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s."

Contributors to the new volume, entitled "Counter-Intelligence," include senior present and former CIA and DIA officials.

Two of the most provocative papers in the book are by Mr Norman L. Smith and Mr Doronov Pratt, who were formerly (respectively) chief of operations and research director on the CIA's counter-intelligence staff.

Mr Smith argues that it is necessary to re-establish a centralised CI staff with a wide purview, not only to ensure the security of the CIA's intelligence-collection and covert action operations, but to undertake its own offensive double-agent and deception activities against the KGB.

He argues the very special qualifications required to make a successful CI specialist — not only in terms of intellectual ability, but in terms of familiarity with hundreds of individual cases over many years. He rightly observes that the Soviet intelligence services place great emphasis on the kind of historical research for which no computerised data bank can substitute.

the creation of a fully clandestine service, outside the present CIA structure, to conduct intelligence and CI operations.

The present CIA, largely reduced to analysis, covert action and paramilitary operations (none of which are likely to remain secret indefinitely, or perhaps even for very long) would remain to deflect interest and scandal away from the clandestine service.

This is one of the many current proposals for the restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community that will be reaching Mr Casey's desk.

Within the narrower area of CI itself, Mr Casey will be urged by some members of the CIA transition team to re-initiate the review of Soviet deception operations — especially those involving double agents in New York who may have been controlled by the KGB — that was aborted by the 1974 purge.

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